Abstract-In this paper, we present an analytical model as well as a practical mechanism to detect denial of service (DoS) attacks on secondary users in dynamic spectrum access (DSA) networks. In particular, we analyze primary user emulation attacks (PUEA) in cognitive radio networks without using any location information and therefore can do away with dedicated sensor networks. We present an analysis using Fenton's approximation and Wald's sequential probability ratio test (WSPRT) to detect PUEA. Simulation results demonstrate that it is possible to keep the probability of success of PUEA low, while still keeping the probability of missing the return of the primary low as well.
I. INTRODUCTION Dynamic spectrum access (DSA) networks [1] have received a lot of attention in the recent decade because of their inherent ability to provide better use of limited radio resources. DSA networks are characterized by two types of users: (i) the primary users who hold licenses to spectral bands and have the highest priority to access these bands and (ii) the secondaries who do not have licenses, but can use these bands when the bands are idle. It is expected that the secondary users will continuously sense the spectrum bands for the return of the primary and will evacuate as soon as the return of the primary user is sensed [2] . A detailed description of the different sensing mechanisms to detect white spaces is provided in [3] , and protocols for sensing primary transmission can be found in [4] . Since the onus of detecting the return of the primary and consequent evacuation lies entirely on the secondary and since there is no policing mechanism to ensure that this protocol is followed, several denial-of service (DoS) attacks are possible on either the primary [5] or the secondary users [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] . For example, a set of secondary users (called "malicious users") could transmit signals with characteristics identical to that of a primary transmitter, leading other "good" secondary users (that follow the normal spectrum evacuation etiquette) to vacate the spectrum unnecessarily. Such attacks are called primary user emulation attacks (PUEA), and were first discussed by Chen and Park in [6] .
Chen and Park also proposed several mechanisms for detection of PUEA using localization techniques [6] , [7] . These methods often assume the presence of a dedicated sensor network to help with the localization of transmitters which is then This work was partially supported by NSF Cyber Trust Grant No. 0627688.
used to compare against known location of TV transmitters to detect PUEA. Other studies on detection of primary user using spectrum sensing and false spectrum reporting (e.g., [10] ) were made, but they do not discuss PUEA.
We presented the first analytical model to characterize the received power at the secondary and obtained a lower bound on the probability of successful PUEA in [8] . We considered a fading wireless environment and derived expressions for the probability of successful PUEA using Fenton's approximation. We then used Markov inequality to provide a lower bound on the probability of successful PUEA. In this paper, we present a Wald's sequential probability ratio test (WSPRT) to detect PUEA by first developing a mathematical formulation for the probability density function (pdf) of the received signal from the malicious users. We also show by simulations that our proposed detection mechanism can ensure that the good secondary users always obey the spectrum evacuation etiquette.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the formulation of the problem, the system model and the assumptions made in our analysis. We present our analysis in Section III. Numerical results are presented in Section IV. Section V provides the conclusion.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a scenario where all secondary and malicious users are distributed in a circular grid. A primary user (e.g., a TV tower), is located at some distance from all the users. Secondary users sense the spectrum using energy detection [3] , to detect white spaces or the return of the primary. The secondary users 1 measure the received power on a spectrum band. If the received power is below a specified threshold then the spectrum band is considered to be vacant (white space). If the received power is above the specified threshold, then based on the measured power, a decision is made as to whether the received signal was transmitted by a primary transmitter or by a set of malicious users. We design a WSPRT to obtain a criterion for making this decision. We make the following assumptions (most of them are same as in [8] ) to perform the analysis.
1) There are M malicious users in the system. 1 By "secondary users", we mean the "good secondary users" through out this paper unless stated otherwise.
2) The primary transmitter is at a minimum distance of d p from all the users. 3) The primary transmits at a power P t and the malicious users transmit at a power P m . 4) The positions of the secondary and malicious users are uniformly distributed in the circular grid of radius R. The positions of the good users and the malicious users are statistically independent of each other. 5) For any secondary user fixed at co-ordinates 2 (r, θ), no malicious users are present within a circle of radius R 0 (called the "exclusive distance from the secondary user") centered at (r, θ). If this restriction is not posted, then the received power at the secondary due to transmission from any subset of malicious users present within a distance R 0 from the secondary becomes too large to create PUEA [8] .
6) The co-ordinates of the primary transmitter are fixed at a point (r p , θ p ) and this position is known to all the users in the grid. 7) The RF signals from the primary transmitter and the malicious users undergo path loss and log-normal shadowing. The Rayleigh fading is assumed to be averaged out and can hence be ignored. This is because, the probabilities scale linearly with the mean, Δ, of the Rayleigh fading [8] , and Δ = 1 in most cases [11] . 8) When represented in decibels (dB), the loss due to shadowing at any secondary user both from the primary transmitter and from any malicious user is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ 2 p and σ 2 m , respectively. 9) As explained in [8] , the path loss exponent for the propagation from the primary transmitter to any secondary users is 2 and that between any malicious user and any secondary user is 4. 10) There is no communication or co-operation between the secondary users. The PUEA on each secondary user can be analyzed independent of each other.
III. ANALYTICAL MODEL
Since there is no co-operation between the secondary users, the probability of successful PUEA on any user is same as that on any other user. Hence, without loss of generality, we analyze the pdf of the received signal at any one secondary user. We transform the co-ordinates of all malicious users such that the secondary user of interest lies at the origin (i.e., at (0, 0)). The primary transmitter is then at a co-ordinate
3 . By assumptions 4) and 5) in Section II, all malicious nodes are uniformly distributed in the annular region with radii R 0 and R as shown in Fig. 1 . In order to obtain a hypothesis test using WSPRT, it is essential to obtain the pdf of the received signal at the secondary user due to transmission by the primary and the malicious users. We first derive the pdf of the received signal in Section III-A. dp R0 R Good Secondary User Malicious Secondary User Primary Transmitter Fig. 1 . A typical cognitive radio network in a circular grid with secondary and malicious users. No malicious users can be closer than R 0 to the secondary user because if this restriction is not posted, then the power received due to transmission from any subset of malicious users present within this grid will be much larger than that due to a transmission from a primary transmitter thus resulting in failed PUEA all the time [8] .
A. Probability Density Function of the Received Signal
Consider M malicious users located at co-ordinates (r j , θ j ) 1 ≤ j ≤ M . Since the position of the j th malicious user is uniformly distributed in the annular region between R 0 and R, r j and θ j are statistically independent ∀ j. The pdf of r j , p(r j ) ∀ j is given by
while θ j is uniformly distributed in (−π, π) ∀ j. The received power at a secondary user from the primary transmitter, P
r , is given by
where G r , p (P r) (γ), follows a log-normal distribution and can be written as
where A = ln 10 10 and μ p = 10 log 10 P t − 20 log 10 d p .
The total received power at the secondary node from all the M malicious users is given by
where d m is the distance between the j th malicious user and the secondary user and G 
As explained in [8] , conditioned on the positions of all the malicious users, P (m) r can be approximated as a log-normally distributed random variable whose mean and variance can be obtained using Fenton's method [12] .
The pdf of P 
where r is the vector with elements
respectively. The pdf of the received power from all the malicious users, p (m) (χ), can then be obtained by averaging Eqn. (7) over r 1 , r 2 , · · · r M and can be written as
where p(r j ) can be obtained from Eqn. (1). Evaluating Eqn. (10) is very complex. Therefore, we approximate the pdf p (m) (χ) to be a log-normally distributed random variable with parameters μ χ and σ 2 χ of the form
If P (m) r is a log-normally distributed random variable with pdf given in Eqn. (11), σ 2 χ and μ χ can be obtained as [13] (12) and
From Eqn. (7), the conditional expectation of P can then be obtained by 4 The expressions in Eqns. (8) and (9) can be obtained by following the steps specified in the Appendix in [8] . 5 The expressions in Eqns. (7) and (10) should also be conditioned and averaged over the co-ordinates (and hence have integrations over) θ 1 , θ 2 , · · ·, θ M . However, from Eqns. (6), (8) and (9), it is observed that the expressions are independent of θ 1 , θ 2 , · · ·, θ M . Therefore, it is sufficient if the averaging (and integrations) are performed over r 1 , r 2 , · · ·, r M . 
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Substituting the above expressions in Eqns. (12) and (13), we evaluate σ 2 χ and μ χ , which, in turn, can be substituted in Eqn. (11) to evaluate the pdf p (m) (χ).
B. Wald's Sequential Probability Ratio Test
In this subsection, we formulate the WSPRT to detect PUEA. We consider two hypotheses, H 1 : that the detected signal was transmitted by the primary, and H 2 : that the detected signal was transmitted by malicious users. The space of all observations is the sample space of the received power measured at the secondary user. It is observed that there are two kinds of risks incurred by a secondary user in this hypothesis test.
1) False Alarm: When the actual transmission is made
by malicious users but the secondary decides that the transmission is due to the primary. In other words, the PUEA is successful. 2) Miss: When the actual transmission is made by the primary transmitter but the secondary decides that the transmission is due to the malicious users. In other words, the secondary unintentionally violates the spectrum etiquette.
The WSPRT allows us to specify desired thresholds α 1 and α 2 for the false alarm and miss probabilities respectively. The decision variable after n sequential tests, Λ n , is given by
where x i is the measured power at the i th stage. In the above, p (P r) (x i ) and p (m) (x i ) are given by Eqns. (3) and (11), respectively. The decision is then made based on the following criterion:
Eqn. (17) provides a practical mechanism to detect PUEA. The estimated average number of observations required to arrive at a decision is given by [14] 
where the function f (x 1 ) = ln Λ 1 . From Eqns. (3), (11) and (16),
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The values of the system parameters we consider for our numerical simulations are listed in Table I Fig. 2 displays the false alarm probability (i.e., the probability of successful PUEA) for threshold pairs (α 1 , α 2 ) set at (0.2, 0.1) and (0.1, 0.1). It is observed that there is a value of R for which the probability of false alarm is maximum. This is because, for a given R 0 , if R is small, the malicious users are closer to the secondary user and the total received power from all the malicious users is likely to be larger than that received from the primary transmitter. Therefore it is more probable that Λ n exceeds T 2 , thus decreasing the probability of successful PUEA. Similarly, for large R, the cumulative received power at the secondary from the malicious users may not be sufficient to successfully launch PUEA. It is observed from Fig. 2(b) that the experimental value of the false alarm probability exceeds the desired threshold when α 1 = α 2 = 0.1. This indicates that it is not possible to keep both the false alarm probability as well as the miss probability below arbitrarily desired thresholds. In other words, for each specified α 2 , there is a minimum α 1 below which thresholds on probability of successful PUEA may not be achieved. Fig. 3 shows the probability of missing the primary transmission for (α 1 , α 2 )=(0.2, 0.1) and (0.1, 0.1). It is observed that, as in Fig. 2 , there is some R for which the miss probability is maximum. Note, however, that it is always possible to make sure that the probability of missing the primary stays strictly below the required threshold. This is particularly important in DSA networks to ensure that the secondaries will always obey the spectrum sharing etiquette.
Another important parameter to consider when constructing sequential tests is the number of samples that are needed for convergence of the test. Fig. 4 7 shows the theoretical and experimental curves of average number of observations required by the secondary user to make a decision when there are 10 malicious users in the system. The gap between the experimental and theoretical curves are typical of WSPRT [14] . Note that more observations are required as the threshold on false alarm probability reduces from 0.2 to 0.1. This is because, from Eqn. (17), as α 1 decreases, threshold T 1 decreases and threshold T 2 increases. Thus, it is more likely that the secondary user takes decision D 3 (i.e., observes more samples).
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed an analytical model and a practical mechanism using WSPRT to detect PUEA in cognitive radio networks. The detection mechanism allows the user to set thresholds on probability of missing the primary user and the probability of successful PUEA and hence can accommodate a range of sensitivities. It is possible to construct tests that always keep the probability of missing the primary user below a specified threshold, while still keeping the probability of successful PUEA low. Average number of observations when a) 10 malicious users are transmitting; b) primary user is transmitting; c) 10 malicious users are transmitting; d) primary user is transmitting.
